A primer on one of the stranger setups on the board: a profitable digital-media holding company that just sold a single segment for more than its entire market cap was worth, now sitting on ~$21/share of net cash, with a short base that peaked at 17.6% of the float and an August 6 earnings print three weeks out.
The opposite, actually. Invert it into a yield and see. 4.5x EBITDA-less-capex is a 22% pre-tax cash yield on enterprise value (about 17% after the company's 24% tax rate, which squares with roughly $200M of free cash flow on a ~$1.1B EV). The 4.5x only sounds expensive next to the 3.0x EV/EBITDA headline: the number is higher because the metric is more honest (ZD capitalizes heavy software spend), not because the stock is dearer.
The way to test whether a multiple on a shrinking business is cheap: back out what decline rate the price implies. Value a declining perpetuity at a 10% required return, and 4.5x is fair only if cash flow shrinks roughly 12% a year, forever. The actual observed rate is 3 to 4%, guided to narrow. Plug the real melt rate in and the implied return at this price is roughly 17 to 18% a year. That is the margin of safety expressed as arithmetic: the market is pricing a collapse, the filings show erosion.
The comps agree once you look at businesses that actually melt. The canonical managed-decline assets, tobacco, trade at 7 to 9x EBITDA-less-capex with volumes falling ~5% a year, because a shrinking cash stream returned to shareholders is still worth a real multiple. ZD trades at roughly half of Altria's multiple while shrinking at a slower rate, holding net cash, and owning segments (Cyber, Health assets) that healthy comps price at 10 to 20x. Meanwhile the one clearing price we have for ZD assets on this exact metric is 14.5x, set by a sophisticated buyer seven weeks ago.
And against its actual competitors, ZD is priced below every profitable name on the board, including the ones that are genuinely dying:
| Tier | Company | EV / EBITDA (TTM) |
|---|---|---|
| The melting-cube cohort | Future plc (UK publisher, same AI fears) | 3.8x |
| Taboola | 4.6x | |
| BuzzFeed / Outbrain-Teads | negative EBITDA | |
| The structural twin | IAC (Dotdash Meredith parent, same SOTP-discount story) | 4.2x |
| Steady mid-tier internet | Yelp | 5.2x |
| TripAdvisor | 6.4x | |
| Cars.com | 6.6x | |
| What ZD's segments comp against | GoodRx (consumer health) | 10.2x |
| Gen Digital (consumer cyber) | 11.5x | |
| News Corp / NYT / Doximity | 12.2x / 16.5x / 20.6x | |
| Private-market marks | Connectivity sale to Accenture (actual transaction) | 14.5x EBITDA-less-capex |
| Bending Spoons | "double-digit" (per ZD's CEO) | |
| Ziff Davis | Four profitable segments, net cash, count shrinking 11%/yr | ~3.0x |
Comp multiples are vendor TTM figures (FMP, Aug 7, 2026) and GAAP-flavored, so treat as ±1 turn; each company defines adjusted EBITDA differently. The direction survives any adjustment: ZD is the cheapest profitable name in the set, priced below its own structural twin (IAC) and below the cohort that is actually melting, while its segments individually comp against names at 10 to 20x.
The Bending Spoons mirror. ZD's CEO was asked on the call about Bending Spoons, the Milan digital-brand acquirer that IPO'd July 1. Same playbook (buy neglected digital assets, run them for cash), nearly identical revenue scale, priced six times apart:
| Bending Spoons (BSP) | Ziff Davis (ZD) | |
|---|---|---|
| Market cap / EV | ~$23B / ~$27B (~$4B net debt) | ~$1.84B / ~$1.11B (~$734M net cash) |
| Revenue | $1.31B (2025), +95% y/y | ~$1.21B LTM, −2.7% y/y |
| Adjusted EBITDA | $700M 2025 → $1.4B guided 2026 | $370M LTM |
| EV / adj EBITDA (2026E) | ~19x (~39x trailing) | ~3.1x (~3.0x trailing) |
| Revenue model | Subscriptions/products: Evernote, WeTransfer, Vimeo, AOL, Remini, komoot | ~Half advertising/affiliate: CNET, IGN, PCMag, MedPage + subs |
| AI-traffic exposure | Essentially none | High (AIOs on 50% of relevant queries) |
| Share count | Growing (issued $1.68B at IPO) | Shrinking ~11%/yr ($200M YTD buyback) |
| Capital strategy | Issue expensive paper + debt to buy assets ($1B+ deals) | Retire cheap paper; sell assets at private multiples (14.5x) |
| $1 of 2026E EBITDA costs | ~$19 | ~$3 |
Part of the gap is deserved: subscriptions beat ads in an AI world, and +95% beats −3%. Part is sentiment: fresh IPO glamour vs melting-cube stigma on asset bases that overlap more than the multiples imply. Each management arbitrages its own multiple in the rational direction: Bending Spoons issues at 19x to buy; ZD retires its own stock at 3x. ZD does not need the gap to close to 19x; a re-rate to Yelp's 5x is roughly +60% on the enterprise value. BSP data: IPO filings and Multiples.vc as of Aug 4, 2026; ZD as of Aug 7.
So the honest ranking of the multiples: 3.0x flatters it, 14.5x is what a private buyer pays, 7 to 9x is what public markets pay for well-run decline, and 4.5x is where it trades. Expensive is the one thing it isn't. The debate is only ever about whether the decline stays at 3 to 4% or accelerates toward the AIO curve. That is the Q4 test, and it is why that print is the tripwire rather than the price.
Data as of Aug 7, 2026 ~1:35pm ET · price ~$53.70, 34.3M shares, LTM adjusted EBITDA $370.4M and LTM capex ~$132M through 6/30/26 (company slides, FMP) · not investment advice.
The quarter: revenue $286.7M (−2.7% y/y, roughly in line), adjusted EBITDA $76.8M at a 26.8% margin (−30bps y/y). The Q1 promise on Tech & Shopping delivered: the decline improved from −13% y/y to −5.0%, with segment EBITDA up 8.6% on lower revenue — the traffic-transition playbook working. Sequentially, adjusted EBITDA rose 21% and adjusted EPS rose 43% versus Q1.
The wart: a $54.8M goodwill impairment in Health & Wellness (segment revenue −4.8% y/y, EBITDA −9.7%) drove a GAAP operating loss. Non-cash, but the one genuine negative: H&W flipped from last quarter's bright spot to this quarter's problem, and the impairment says management lowered its own forecast. Gaming and Cybersecurity also decelerated y/y. GAAP net income including the sale gain: +$624M ($17.16/share).
Capital return went fully explicit. $200M deployed for 4.5M shares YTD (avg ~$44), share count down 11% in seven months, a 10b5-1 plan buying through blackout, and Vivek's own words: acquisitions "compete with our own stock" (M&A got just $9.2M YTD vs $200M of buyback) and the answer to the valuation gap is to "be an aggressive buyer of stock, don't wait for the market to rerate." No tender: "deliberate, strategic." Prepared remarks confirmed Connectivity went at 14.5x adjusted EBITDA less capex, roughly 5x the multiple the market charges for the rest of the company.
The honesty cut both ways. The H&W impairment was explained as structural, not cyclical: "the structural challenge is real," large pharma spend down, lower-cost AI-based platforms adding inventory to the HCP ad market. And a new fault-line stat: 50% of ZD's queries now trigger Google AI Overviews, up from 36% a quarter ago (per the call transcript; the live-notes version of this banner briefly said 36%). Gaming's soft ad quarter got the hits-cycle defense with a dated catalyst (GTA 6, November). On AI licensing: no cheap RAG deals that would compromise compensation for foundational training; the OpenAI litigation is the point, the precedent is the prize.
The soft guide (formal guidance still suspended): Q3 revenue up sequentially but down low-to-mid single digits year over year, adjusted EBITDA margin up modestly, Q4 improving on Q3 with a lower rate of y/y decline. No return-to-growth claim, which quietly retires May's stated goal of returning to y/y revenue growth in H2 2026. Cash calls ahead: ~$200M of sale taxes plus $149M converts due November, so pro forma net cash is closer to ~$534M (~$15.50/sh) and reported H2 FCF will look artificially crushed by the one-time tax payment.
Net read: the revenue side got incrementally worse, the capital side got incrementally better. This is a shrinking top line attached to the most aggressive per-share value machine in digital media, at under 3x EBITDA.
What the verbatim transcript added (Quartr, ~2h post-call). The $54.8M impairment was never mentioned on the call, by management or by any of the only four analysts who asked questions; the 10-Q footnote is now the sole disclosure. Two promises were quietly retired: May's "return to year-over-year revenue growth in H2 2026" became "Q4 shows a lower rate of decline," and the Q1 commitment that Tech & Shopping improves every quarter was not restated (delivery so far is real: Q4'25 −18%, Q1 −13%, Q2 −5%). New disclosure: the majority of code ZD now releases is AI-authored, "nearly all" expected by end of 2026, with 24% more code shipped in Q2 than Q1 on lower engineering headcount. Cash mechanics: the ~$200M of sale taxes pays out through Q1 2027 (investment tax credits being explored to shrink it), the $149M converts get repaid in cash November 1, and there are "no plans to redeem any debt prior to maturity." Buyback precision: 2.6M shares in Q2, another 700K in the open market since July 1, roughly 13M repurchased since the start of 2024, about 7M shares left on the authorization.
Day one traded like a squeeze because it is one. The 62% call-fade pattern broke: the stock opened at a new 52-week high and held +12-13% on roughly 3-4x normal volume. Into the print, 4.41M shares were short (13.3% of float, 7.8 days to cover, 7/15 settlement). A paper-trail sweep of every 13F filed since April that touches ZD found no fund with a meaningful put position and no published short thesis anywhere; decomposing the short base, roughly 10-15% is convertible-arb hedging against the $263M of 3.625% 2028 converts ($100 conversion price), about 5% is options market-maker inventory, and 80-85% is anonymous directional shorts, underwater from $30s-40s entries, now fighting a float the buyback shrinks every week. The settlements publishing around Aug 12 and Aug 25 will show how much of this week was covering.
Where valuation stands at ~$57: EV/EBITDA moved from ~2.8x to ~3.3x in a morning (~3.9x treating the tax bill as spent), a ~16% free-cash-flow yield on enterprise value, and ~$15.50/share of pro forma net cash. Still cheap in absolute terms, no longer the giveaway. From here the return engine is the share count, further asset monetizations at private-market multiples, and Q4 delivering the promised narrower decline, against a traffic fault line that is accelerating, not creeping: AI Overviews on 50% of relevant queries, up from 36% a single quarter ago.
Data as of the Aug 6, 2026 6:00pm ET release, the Aug 7 8:30am ET earnings call (verified against the Quartr transcript), the Aug 7 midday tape (FMP), and Nasdaq/FINRA short interest at the 7/15/26 settlement · figures are continuing operations ex-Connectivity unless noted · not investment advice.
A holding company wearing a magazine brand's name.
Ziff Davis is not really a magazine publisher, though the name (and PCMag) descends from one. It is the former j2 Global: a serial acquirer that spent two decades buying niche digital businesses for cash flow, spun off its fax/cloud unit (Consensus) in 2021, took the Ziff Davis name, and kept CEO Vivek Shah at the helm. The DNA is capital allocation: buy assets cheap, run them for cash, and increasingly, sell them when someone pays more than the public market will.
After the Connectivity sale, four reporting segments remain (FY2025 revenue, per the 10-K and the June 8-K/A pro formas):
Shares of FY2025 remaining-company revenue of ~$1.22B. Also acquired in Q2'26: Popular Science, Dwell, Domino, Business of Home.
2021–22: Post-spin, ZD is a quiet digital compounder. 2023: ad softness exposes cyclicality and the "melting digital media bundle" narrative takes hold. 2024: M&A restarts ("the time is now," Q2'24 call): Gamer Network, CNET. 2025: the underappreciated move: ZD re-cuts reporting into five segments, which is what makes a sum-of-the-parts argument possible at all. Q2'25 is the high-water print (~10% revenue growth, four of five segments growing), then Q4'25 Tech & Shopping falls 18% and cracks the story. 2026: the unlock goes explicit. March 3: Connectivity sold to Accenture for $1.2B, a price above the prior day's entire market cap. June 17: deal closes. The stock runs from a $22.45 52-week low to the mid-$50s, touching $54.95 on July 20.
Management sold a segment at ~11x EBITDA (management's own framing: ~14.5x 2025 adjusted EBITDA less capex, more than 5x revenue, an estimated 5x return on invested capital) into a market that was valuing the same assets, plus four other segments, at ~$1.05B all-in. That single transaction converted ZD from a "melting media conglomerate" into a cash-rich stub trading at ~3x EBITDA, run by people who have now demonstrated they will sell pieces when the private bid beats the public one.
Rebuilt from the SEC pro formas (8-K/A filed 6/22/26), not vendor data. Vendor "EBITDA" fields understate ZD badly because they miss intangible-amortization add-backs and a non-cash goodwill impairment.
| Step | Amount |
|---|---|
| Market cap (36.8M sh × $51.60, 7/24) | ~$1.90B |
| Cash & equivalents (pro forma 3/31/26) | $1,676.7M |
| + Escrow receivable + long-term investments | $137.1M |
| − Total debt (incl. $148.8M current convertible) | ($867.1M) |
| − Estimated tax on the sale gain | ($181.7M) |
| = Net cash | ~$765M (~$21/share) |
| = Enterprise value | ~$1.16B |
| Remaining-co adjusted EBITDA (FY25, rebuilt) | ~$380M (~31% margin) |
| EV / adjusted EBITDA | ~3.0x |
| Remaining-co free cash flow (FY25 est.) | ~$200M (~17% of EV) |
EBITDA rebuild: pro forma operating income $104.9M + D&A $199.7M + goodwill impairment $17.6M + stock comp ~$41M + M&A/integration add-backs ~$15M ≈ $378M. Stock-comp split between sold and retained businesses is estimated; the company-defined figure could land $375–385M (2.9x–3.1x). Whole-company 2025 FCF was $288M actual (op cash flow $407M less capex $119M).
Strip out the cash and you are paying ~$31/share for businesses earning ~$380M of adjusted EBITDA. The market just watched one ZD segment transact at ~11x and is pricing the four remaining segments at ~3x. Evercore's $61 target implies re-rating that stub only to ~7–8x, still below the private-market print.
ZD discloses segment revenue but not segment EBITDA, so the EBITDA column is estimated. Multiples are private-market marks, not where public no-growth media trades.
| Segment (FY2025) | Revenue | YoY | Est. EBITDA | Multiple | Implied EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Health & Wellness (pharma/HCP media) | $402M | +11% | ~$140M | 9–12x | $1.3–1.7B |
| Cybersecurity & Martech (software-ish) | $278M | −2% | ~$86M | 8–11x | $0.7–0.9B |
| Technology & Shopping (commodity media) | $357M | −1% | ~$107M | 6–7x | $0.6–0.75B |
| Gaming & Entertainment (IGN, Humble) | $184M | +2% | ~$50M | 8–11x | $0.4–0.6B |
| Sum: remaining-co EV | $1.22B | ~$385M | ~$3.0–3.9B | ||
| vs. market-implied remaining-co EV | ~$1.2B |
Add back the ~$765M of net cash and the SOTP equity value is roughly $3.6–4.5B, or $95–120 per share, against $51.60. The single sharpest line in the whole argument: Health & Wellness alone, growing 11%, in the premium pharma/physician-media vertical (Doximity-adjacent, and Doximity trades north of 20x), is worth ~$1.4B at 10x. That one segment covers the market's implied value for the entire remaining company; at today's price you get Tech & Shopping, Cyber & Martech, IGN, and the cash pile for free.
| Segment | FY24→25 | Q1'26 YoY | Read |
|---|---|---|---|
| Technology & Shopping | −1.5% | −12.9% | Melting: AI search is eating buying-guide traffic, and the decline accelerated |
| Cybersecurity & Martech | −1.9% | +3.6% | Turned: was declining, now stabilized |
| Health & Wellness | +11.0% | +0.2% | Stalled: the biggest segment and the swing factor |
| Gaming & Entertainment | +1.8% | +7.2% | Growing: record Humble Bundle quarter |
| Total (continuing ops) | +2.7% | −1.9% | Ex-Tech & Shopping, the company grew ~3% |
This table is the bull/bear dividing line. Bears extrapolate the −13% corner across the whole company and call 3x fair. Bulls point out that ~73% of the remaining revenue base was flat to growing, and that management has committed to total continuing-ops growth returning in 2H26 with each successive Tech & Shopping quarter improving year over year. Those commitments get their first test August 6.
The irony at the center of ZD: the content AI search is starving is the same content ZD is suing OpenAI over, and the same content peers are now licensing for real money.
Licensing revenue may replace traffic revenue rather than add to it, and the Q1 call contained management's most honest line on this: certain affiliate-commerce traffic "is harder for us to replace." ZD is also visibly absent from the new paid distribution surfaces (Wiley's 41-partner network, the Netflix lifestyle-content deal with Condé Nast, Hearst, and People). Absence can mean discipline and a lawsuit strategy. It can also just mean absence.
Since the June 17 close, there has been no capital-allocation announcement: no tender, no special dividend, no accelerated repurchase. That $1.2B has now been idle for over five weeks. The Q2 print (buyback dollars with the deal blackout over) is the first hard evidence of how management reads its own stock. A big number confirms the thesis; a small one with a mediocre acquisition attached weakens it.
Pulled from the last eight-plus quarters of earnings calls (FMP transcripts) and recent investor events. Machine transcription; wording spot-checked but treat as near-verbatim.
"In 2021 the company generated $485 million of adjusted EBITDA and the stock hit a high of almost $130. This year the midpoint of our guidance has us generating $523 million of adjusted EBITDA and the stock is currently in the 30s with almost 12% fewer shares outstanding. While the market processes this we will continue to lean into this dislocation."
"The disconnect between the current value of the company and... the true value of the company in our own minds, is probably at the widest it's ever been... we believe every one of our divisions should command a multiple, each of them individually, higher than what is the current Ziff Davis multiple."
The enterprise "is trading roughly three to four times EBITDA."
"Our current stock price implies that we're only getting credit [for] the expected cash proceeds of the Connectivity sale while little additional value is being ascribed to the rest of our assets... The market appears to be penalizing the better-performing businesses in our portfolio for sharing an ownership structure with those that are under pressure."
"There are some real market comps for each one of our segments... as you look at a potential value of each segment... I think we'd find that it would be well in excess of the current market value of the company."
"I'd also say to our sell-side and buy-side analysts, I think if you could go through some of the parts valuation exercise, I think that would be revealing."
"We have also received interest from both strategic and private equity investors in certain of our businesses... You'll recall that in 2021, we undertook a similar process that resulted in the spinoff of our Consensus business... Consensus' post spinoff enterprise value was close to $2 billion."
A "transformative" transaction and "a significant realization of value for shareholders."
"We see this as a pivot from our buy-and-hold past to a future in which active monetization represents a key tool in our pursuit of shareholder value creation."
"We do view asset monetization as a new ongoing tool in our kit... as long as the public market value of our EBITDA remains low, and it does, we're going to continue to pursue asset monetization."
"Our shareholders have been patient. We feel an overwhelming obligation to really reward that patience."
"It continues to stand out as, frankly, the best option for our capital. I mean we could buy this, what we believe is an amazing company, at almost unbelievable multiples."
"Since the end of 2022... we have grown free cash flow by 25%, reduced our gross debt levels by nearly 14% and lowered our year-end shares outstanding by more than 18%."
"I'll quote Ben Graham. The intelligent investor is a realist who sells to optimists and buys from pessimists."
Connectivity proceeds will go to "general corporate purposes" and to "fund robust capital allocation activities."
"I put this into the category of possibly the second mouse gets the cheese. And so I'd rather be patient and understand the market a little bit more before we make commitments that become the framework by which we work with all of the [LLMs]."
"Popular curated data sets used in major large language models significantly favor premium publisher content, prioritizing it between five and nearly 100 times more than general web content collected through Common Crawl."
"Our position is consistent. Both use cases require proper licensing. We will not enter into RAG-focused agreements that compromise our rights to fair compensation for foundational training."
"We anticipate greater clarity on these fundamental licensing questions following the resolution of our ongoing litigation. Once established, we believe this clarity will unlock licensing opportunities and allow us to move forward with agreements that appropriately reflect the full value of our content."
"We did attempt in good faith to address and resolve OpenAI's unauthorized use of our content both in its training activities and in its RAG activities. We didn't get to acceptable terms... Look, frankly, if someone's going to steal, we're not just going to sit by and do nothing."
"As of the first of July, we commenced blocking of known AI bots at the CDN level with partners like Cloudflare... up until that point, we were using robots.txt, and the problem with robots.txt, as we've come to see, is that it's a directive that bots can and have chosen to ignore."
"We did in 2025, roughly $90 million in affiliate commerce commissions related to organic traffic. That was down about $25 million year-over-year, and half of that $25 million was in Q4."
"The one type of traffic that really is hard to replace [is] high-intent consumers who arrive via search looking for a product or a service and then clicking through to make a purchase."
Worth tracking as a series: management's own disclosed figure for how often Google AI Overviews appear on ZD's most important queries went from 8% (Q2'24) to 12% (Q4'24) to over 20% (Q1'25) to 29% (Q3'25), while the framing moved from "we don't see it as a significant change to the search experience" to acknowledging "rank volatility" to the Q1'26 concession quoted above. No updated figure has been disclosed since; that gap is itself an Aug 6 watch item.
"At the start of AI, we were viewing it more as sort of 'copilot.' It is now the pilot... where we would talk 4 quarters out or 5 quarters out, we're now talking weeks out to push product."
They are "not writing content using AI," calling it "a very dangerous proposition."
Earnings-call quotes are from FMP machine transcriptions; conference quotes are from event recaps. Bracketed words are cleanups of obvious transcription artifacts. Full transcripts on file for anyone who wants the context around any quote.
| Settlement | Shares short | % of float | Days to cover |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 15, 2025 | 4.06M | 12.2% | 7.1 |
| Dec 31, 2025 | 4.74M | 14.3% | 9.7 |
| Feb 27, 2026 | 5.77M | 17.4% | 5.3 |
| Apr 15, 2026 | 4.07M | 12.3% | 7.0 |
| May 29, 2026 | 5.32M | 16.0% | 9.4 |
| Jun 15, 2026 (peak) | 5.85M | 17.6% | 11.1 |
| Jun 30, 2026 | 5.75M | 17.3% | 6.3 |
| Jul 15, 2026 (latest) | 4.41M | ~13% | 7.8 |
% of float computed on the ~33.2M-share Nasdaq float for consistency; vendors using other float bases show 12.4% (MarketBeat) to higher. Roughly 1 to 1.5 points of the spring rise was the shrinking-float denominator (buybacks); the rest was genuine short adds.
The shape of this series tells the story. Shorts added ~44% from mid-April to mid-June, pressing into the deal close and 52-week highs, peaked at a series high two days before the Accenture close, and then covered 23% in the first half of July as the stock ran to $54.95. Read honestly: part of the July rally was that covering, and the easiest squeeze fuel has partially burned. What remains (~4.4M shares, ~13% of float, ~7.8 days to cover, still up ~38% year over year) keeps the setup two-sided into Aug 6: a clean print meets a shrinking float and a still-elevated short base; a bad print and the shorts who stayed get paid.
| Firm | Rating | Target | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Evercore ISI (Coolbrith) | Outperform | $61 (street high) | May 12 |
| Susquehanna | Positive | $60 | May 5 |
| J.P. Morgan (Carpenter) | Neutral | $50 | Mar 6 |
| RBC (Jaluria) | Outperform | $48 | maintained Jul 15 |
| Barclays (Sandler) | Equal Weight | $48 | May 11 |
| Piper Sandler | $48 | May 11 | |
| UBS | bear outlier | $30 | spring 2026 |
Consensus sits between Hold / avg $47.25 (MarketBeat, 9 firms, 7/17) and Buy / avg $49.40 (stockanalysis.com, 5 analysts, 7/24). Either way, at $51.60 the stock trades above the consensus target. That is usually read one of two ways: the targets are stale after the close and PT catch-ups are coming into the print, or the market has already paid for the re-rating. Goldman initiated at Buy in June; Weiss upgraded from Sell to Hold June 1.
Q2'26 release Thursday Aug 6, 6:00pm ET; call Friday Aug 7, 8:30am ET (Shah and CFO Richter). Graded against management's own Q1 commitments.
| Check | Bar | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Tech & Shopping YoY | Better than −13% | The 2H26 growth bridge dies on the first step if not |
| Total revenue YoY | Better than −2% | Sets up the promised 2H return to growth, Q4 > Q3 |
| Q2 buyback dollars | > $51.6M | Deal blackout is over and the cash is in hand; no excuse left |
| FY26 guidance | Reinstated or not | Continued silence signals more portfolio moves coming |
| Cash deployment | Any announcement | $1.2B idle since June 17 |
| AI licensing deal | First one ever | Wiley and RELX have proven both the annuity and the settlement comp |
You are paying ~3x EBITDA for a cash-rich stub whose managers just proved they can sell pieces at ~11x, with a 17%-of-float short into a dated catalyst and a free option on AI licensing.
They sold the only great asset, the biggest remaining segment just stalled, the melting segment is melting faster, and a stock that has ~2.3x'd off its low on financial engineering is priced above what the sell side thinks it is worth.